Is It Really Safe for a Terror-Sponsoring State Like Pakistan to Have Nuclear Weapons?

There are few things more dangerous than nuclear weapons in the hands of a nation that is internally unstable, ideologically conflicted, and openly tolerant of terrorism. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is not just a matter of national defense — it is a global risk that combines the volatility of politics with the recklessness of extremism.

Pakistan has spent much of its post-independence history swinging between military coups and fragile civilian governments. It has had three full-scale military takeovers (1958, 1977, and 1999), and even in democratic phases, elected leaders often function under the shadow of the military and the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The current political crisis, with former Prime Minister Imran Khan jailed and opposition parties accusing the military of rigging elections, only deepens the cracks in governance.

Simultaneously, ideological extremism is woven into the country’s social and political fabric. Pakistan is home to dozens of radical madrasas, many of which teach sectarian hate, glorify jihad, and act as recruiting grounds for militant groups. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba continue to launch attacks inside the country, while Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operate openly with alleged state backing. Extremist clerics are given space on national television, and hate speech against minorities is rarely punished.

This is not just a nation with nuclear weapons — it is a nuclear-armed state where terrorism is a tolerated, sometimes even strategic, instrument of policy. Pakistan has been repeatedly linked to some of the deadliest terrorist organizations in the world. From harboring Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, mere kilometers from a military academy, to hosting leaders of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the Haqqani Network, the country’s connection to terrorism is not speculation — it is documented fact.

International pressure has forced some cosmetic crackdowns, but core leadership figures like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar continue to live openly and even enjoy political or institutional support. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2016 Pathankot air base attack, and the 2019 Pulwama suicide bombing all trace back to Pakistan-based groups — many of which are allowed to operate freely. This track record makes it deeply concerning that such a nation controls nuclear weapons. Pakistan has experienced multiple military coups since its creation in 1947. Its democracy is fragile, and its foreign and defense policies — including nuclear command — are largely controlled by the Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Civilian governments are often sidelined or overthrown. In such an environment, the military, which has been accused of supporting terrorist groups for strategic depth, holds disproportionate control over nuclear assets. This military-nuclear nexus lacks transparency and increases the possibility of rash decisions or misuse.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s ongoing economic instability, rising inflation, and dependency on international bailouts reflect a state struggling to hold itself together. In such fragile circumstances, safeguarding one of the world’s most dangerous arsenals becomes even harder. Perhaps the most terrifying risk is that of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or technology falling into the hands of terrorists. Several U.S. intelligence assessments and global watchdogs have warned about the “insider threat” — extremist sympathizers within Pakistan’s military or nuclear establishment who could leak sensitive material or even facilitate attacks.

In 2007, a suicide bombing targeted the Sargodha Air Base, suspected to house nuclear warheads. The Taliban has temporarily controlled regions like Swat Valley and continues to exert influence in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These instances illustrate how vulnerable Pakistan’s territory is to extremist incursions.

Moreover, the nuclear scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan, once hailed as a national hero, was caught running a clandestine proliferation network that sold nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya — proving that state-backed nuclear abuse isn’t a hypothetical scenario in Pakistan. It has already happened. Unlike other responsible nuclear powers, Pakistan’s program operates in secrecy, with little to no independent verification. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has limited access, and there is no civilian oversight of Pakistan’s nuclear strategy.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) ranked Pakistan 19th out of 22 countries in terms of nuclear security, citing poor transparency and risk of insider threats. With no binding commitment to international arms control agreements like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Pakistan remains outside the framework of global nuclear governance.

This opacity raises questions not only about safety but also about accountability. If something were to go wrong — a leak, theft, or unauthorized use — the world would have no warning and no reliable way to respond. Rather than using its nuclear arsenal solely for deterrence, Pakistan has a track record of employing it for nuclear blackmail — threatening escalation to shield and embolden terrorism.

After initiating the Kargil conflict in 1999, Pakistan warned of nuclear retaliation if India responded militarily. This pattern repeated in 2001, 2008, and 2019 — following terror attacks traced back to Pakistani soil. In each case, Pakistan relied on the implicit threat of nuclear war to deter a full-scale Indian response.

Pakistan also maintains tactical nuclear weapons — smaller, battlefield nukes that lower the threshold for use in combat. This breaks the global norm of treating nuclear weapons as strategic last-resort tools, and increases the risk of miscalculation, especially in a crisis. Pakistan’s nuclear threat is not regional — it is global. The same terrorist groups that operate freely within its borders have attacked Western interests, killed U.S. citizens, and fought NATO forces in Afghanistan.

The 2008 Mumbai attacks, carried out by LeT operatives trained in Pakistan, claimed the lives of American, Israeli, British, and Indian nationals. The Haqqani Network, with ISI support, has launched deadly attacks on U.S. embassies and troops. Groups like Al-Qaeda and even ISIS-Khorasan have historical links to Pakistan’s militant infrastructure.

If Pakistan’s nuclear assets were ever compromised — by terrorists, rogue elements, or a collapsing state — the fallout would not be limited to India. A dirty bomb in Europe, a smuggled warhead in the Middle East, or nuclear technology falling into the wrong hands could affect global security, trade, and peace for decades. The international community must stop pretending that Pakistan is just another nuclear state. It is a country with a history of terrorism sponsorship, fragile institutions, and military dominance — all dangerous ingredients when combined with weapons of mass destruction.

As long as Pakistan continues to provide safe haven to terrorists and resists genuine reform of its military-intelligence complex, the world must remain vigilant. Diplomatic pressure, conditional aid, and international scrutiny must increase — because the cost of inaction could be nuclear catastrophe.

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